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The views expressed by the authors of the papers 
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of polish authorities.
The role of NATO and the EU 
in tackling hybrid threats
NATO and the EU perceive hybrid threats in a similar 
way. According to NATO “Hybrid threats combine 
military and non-military as well as covert and 
overt means, including disinformation, cyberat-
tacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular 
armed groups and use of regular forces”. They 
are aimed at “blurring the lines between war and 
peace, and sowing doubt in the minds of target 
populations”.1 The EU’s definition seems to be 
more complex. From its perspective “hybrid threats 
combine conventional and unconventional, military 
1 ‘NATO’s response to hybrid threats’, NATO, 8 August 2019, 
www.nato.int.
and non-military activities that can be used in a co-
ordinated manner by state or non-state actors to 
achieve specific political objectives”. The EU places 
emphasis on the multidimensional character of 
hybrid threats, which “range from cyberattacks 
on critical information systems, through the dis-
ruption of critical services such as energy supplies 
or financial services, to the undermining of public 
trust in government institutions or the deepen-
ing of social divisions”. They are targeted against 
“critical vulnerabilities” and exploit “coercive and 
subversive measures”, being “difficult to detect 
or attribute” and designed “to create confusion 
to hinder swift and effective decision-making”.2
2 ‘A Europe that Protects: Countering Hybrid Threats’, EEAS, 
13 June 2018, www.eeas.europa.eu.
Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats
Piotr Szymański
In recent years, NATO and the EU have taken greater responsibility for countering hybrid threats. This 
group of threats covers a wide range of hostile methods used by states and non-state actors. It includes 
both military and non-military activities, for instance special forces operations and irregular warfare, 
and also disinformation and cyberattacks. NATO and the EU are involved in facilitating international 
cooperation on countering hybrid threats and protecting their own structures and institutions against 
them. In this way, both organisations reinforce the efforts at the national level, since fighting hybrid 
threats is primarily a task of the member states. Nevertheless, NATO’s and the EU’s actions in this 
respect are constrained by insufficient financing, and by the member states’ unwillingness to enhance 
the sharing of intelligence and sensitive information related to, for example, critical infrastructure 
protection or cybersecurity. The recent spike in anti-Western COVID-19 disinformation campaigns 
clearly shows that both NATO and the EU could do more to counter hybrid threats.
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Therefore, hybrid threats should be considered an 
umbrella term, encompassing various destabilising 
actions. On the one hand, this blurry definition 
may water dawn the security debate. On the oth-
er, it may foster discussions as individual states 
are able bring their own priorities to the security 
agenda. Addressing hybrid threats takes into ac-
count not only kinetic operations, such as the use 
of troops without insignia, actions against critical 
infrastructure, orchestrating coups d’état or as-
sassinations commissioned by foreign intelligence 
agencies, but also non-kinetic means – for instance 
a wide range of disinformation and propaganda 
measures, sponsoring radical political movements, 
exerting economic pressure, or covert actions 
aimed at destabilising other countries (including 
corrupting politicians). 
The main responsibility for countering hybrid 
threats lies with NATO’s and the EU’s member 
states. Only governments have adequate resources 
for this, in the form of intelligence and counter-
intelligence agencies (both civilian and military), 
uniformed services (ensuring public order and 
safety), means of communication with citizens 
and cyber incident response capabilities. Moreover, 
the national authorities are closer to potential 
threats than international organisations. This, 
combined with a shorter decision-making pro-
cess, makes them more capable of dealing with 
hostile hybrid operations. Safeguarding internal 
security belongs to each state’s vital interests; 
individual governments thus pay more attention 
to enhancing resilience against hybrid threats 
than international organisations.
NATO and the EU have stepped into the fight 
against hybrid threats mainly in response to the 
elevated risk of terrorist attacks, related to the 
emergence of Islamic State, the rise of information 
warfare, increasingly common foreign interference 
in elections (primarily from Russia) and ever more 
harmful cyberattacks. In countering hybrid threats, 
both organisations are focused on the protection 
of their own structures, decision-making processes 
and infrastructure. With regard to the member 
states, NATO and the EU perform subsidiary and 
coordinating roles (for example in ensuring shared 
situational awareness), which means involvement 
in areas where action at the national level proved 
to be ineffective or insufficient. NATO and the EU 
aim for the development of international coop-
eration in countering hybrid threats (including 
NATO-EU cooperation), which has been hindered 
by the divergent threat perceptions of the mem-
ber states. It translates into their engagement in 
facilitating the exchange of lessons learned and 
improving knowledge on hybrid threats, as well 
as in conducting international exercises which 
involve hybrid scenarios. In addition, both or-
ganisations set common standards and minimum 
requirements for their member states regarding 
resilience to hybrid threats (in order to eliminate 
national vulnerabilities affecting European and 
transatlantic security). It relates to, for instance: 
cybersecurity, preventing money laundering, and 
the protection of critical energy infrastructure.
Since Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine 
in 2014, NATO has been more focused on strength-
ening collective defence and the capabilities es-
sential for Article 5 operations. This adaptation of 
NATO’s military posture has been complemented 
by calls for greater investment in beefing up allied 
resilience to hybrid threats. It was mainly due to 
hostile non-military actions by Russia, including: 
interference in the 2016 United States elections, 
the Salisbury nerve agent attack, and attempts to 
prevent Montenegro joining NATO. An important 
strategic message was delivered in the 2016 War-
saw Summit Communiqué, stating that “NATO is 
prepared to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid 
campaign. The Alliance and Allies will be prepared 
to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective de-
fence. The Council could decide to invoke Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty”.3 In order to counter 
the military aspects of hybrid threats (such as 
3 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO, 9 July 2016, www.
nato.int.
In countering hybrid threats, both 
organisations are focused on the 
protection of their own structures, 
decision-making processes and in-
frastructure.
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irregular warfare), NATO has strengthened its in-
telligence capabilities and increased the readiness 
of the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF), by 
establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force (VJTF). In the non-military dimension, NATO 
gives priority to cybersecurity. 
The EU has been increasingly concerned with hy-
brid threats. Since 2014, it has adopted more than 
20 different documents in this field (on countering 
weapons of mass destruction, ensuring the secu-
rity of energy supplies, screening foreign direct 
investments, maritime security, data protection, 
border protection, the security of space domain, 
and others).4 In addition, the EU has been devel-
oping its Programme of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection embedded in the 2008 Directive on 
European Critical Infrastructures. However, in 
recent years, the EU has decided to put situational 
awareness, cybersecurity and disinformation at 
the heart of its efforts to counter hybrid threats. 
In 2019, the Council of the EU acknowledged “the 
possibility for the Member States to invoke the 
Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU) in addressing 
a severe crisis resulting from hybrid activity”.5
NATO’s priorities: situational aware-
ness, cyber defence, exercises
(1) NATO assistance for its member states in re-
sponding to hybrid activities encompasses moni-
toring and analysing, the exchange of intelligence 
and experiences, and ensuring shared situational 
awareness. Establishing a new branch for the 
analysis of hybrid threats (including cyber threats) 
within the structure of the Joint Intelligence and 
Security Division in the NATO Headquarters, along 
with enhancing cooperation between civilian and 
military intelligence, have been significant devel-
opments in this field. It was part of a broader re-
form of NATO’s intelligence conducted in 2017. The 
hybrid branch was tasked with the comprehensive 
4 D. Fiott, R. Parkes, Protecting Europe: the EU’s response 
to hybrid threats, European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, 2019.
5 ‘Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter 
hybrid threats – Council Conclusions’, The Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, 10 December 2019, data.consilium.europa.eu.
analysis of the challenges to transatlantic security, 
involving various military and non-military aspects 
of hybrid threats. It has, however, been only a first 
step towards enhancing shared situational aware-
ness with regard to hybrid threats. NATO does not 
have its own intelligence service and thus relies 
on intelligence provided by the national agencies. 
Furthermore, the member states remain reluctant 
to share intelligence within NATO. This results 
from the deficits in mutual trust between them 
and concerns about the safety of classified data 
and information.6 In practice, more advanced 
intelligence cooperation has been taking place 
on a bilateral basis or within smaller groups of 
the member states.
(2) In 2018, NATO set up counter-hybrid support 
teams, which consist of experts specialised in 
providing assistance to members struggling with 
hostile hybrid activity. This mechanism was acti-
vated for the first time in 2019 by Montenegro. It 
wants to take advantage of NATO’s expertise in 
responding to Russia’s hybrid threats in order to 
protect the 2020 parliamentary elections. These 
extraordinary measures were motivated by Rus-
sia’s efforts to destabilise Montenegro, including 
the attempted coup d’état in 2016. The team’s 
mission was focused on the necessary changes in 
legislation and cybersecurity. In this case, NATO’s 
experts worked together with the US ones.7 There 
is no open source information on the further de-
ployments of counter-hybrid support teams. Per-
haps other member states have not experienced 
large-scale hybrid activities, which would have 
required assistance from NATO experts. Howev-
er, the unwillingness to reveal the vulnerabilities 
6 J. Ballast, ‘Trust (in) NATO – The future of intelligence sharing 
within the Alliance’, NATO Defense College, Research Paper, 
No. 140, September 2017, www.ndc.nato.int.
7 S. Lekic, ‘First NATO counter-hybrid warfare team to de- 
ploy to Montenegro’, Stars and Stripes, 8 November 2019, 
www.stripes.com.
NATO assistance for its member 
states in responding to hybrid ac-
tivities encompasses the exchange of 
intelligence and experiences, and en-
suring shared situational awareness.
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of their defence systems or doubts about the 
prospects of receiving timely and well-tailored 
assistance may serve as an alternative explanation.
(3) Cybersecurity has never been more essential 
for NATO. This was proved by cyberspace being 
recognised as a domain of operations (equal to 
the air, land and sea military domains) at the 
2016 Warsaw Summit as well as by affirming 
that a cyberattack could trigger Article 5 at the 
2014 Newport Summit.8 NATO plays a triple role 
in cyberspace. It motivates the allies to invest 
more in cybersecurity, serves as a platform for 
information sharing and training, and protects 
its own networks and supports the security of 
its member states’ networks.
In 2016, NATO adopted the Cyber Defence Pledge 
aimed at strengthening capabilities vital for the 
cyber defences of national infrastructures and 
networks. It also mentioned the need of allocating 
adequate resources for cyber defence, however, 
without setting a NATO target level for cyber 
spending as a share of defence budget.9
In recent years, among the European NATO mem-
bers, the largest investments in cyber defence 
were declared by the United Kingdom and France 
(1.9 billion pounds in 2016-2021 and 1.6 billion 
euros in 2019-2025 respectively). Some of the 
member states have also developed offensive 
cyber capabilities. Already nine of them made 
these capabilities available for NATO operations.10 
In terms of cyber exercises and expertise, NATO 
relies on the Tallinn-based Cooperative Cyber De-
fence Centre of Excellence (established in 2008). 
8 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, op. cit. “Cyberattacks can 
reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic 
prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be 
as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. 
We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s 
core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cy-
berattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would 
be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case 
basis”. Wales Summit Declaration, NATO, 5 September 
2014, www.nato.int.
9 Cyber Defence Pledge, NATO, 8 July 2016, www.nato.int.
10 Namely: the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Estonia, Norway, 
Germany, France, Denmark and Lithuania. S. Vavra, ‘NATO 
cyber-operations center will be leaning on its members 
for offensive hacks’, Cyberscoop, 30 September 2019, 
www.cyberscoop.com.
It organises the biggest allied cyber defence 
Locked Shields exercises, held on an annual basis. 
NATO’s networks are, in turn, protected by the 
Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), 
which has 200 personnel. The NCIRC is ready to 
reinforce the member states’ networks by dis-
patching the NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams as 
well. These standby teams are intended to provide 
short-notice assistance to allies facing cyberattack.
In 2018, NATO established the Cyberspace Op-
erations Centre. Its core tasks include: ensuring 
a shared situational awareness on cyber threats, 
coordinating member states’ activities in cyber-
space, as well as protecting NATO’s operations 
and mission. However, it is expected to reach full 
operational capability only in 2023. This lengthy 
process may result from the difficulties in hiring 
experts due to competition with the private sector. 
The cooperation in cyber defence is also hindered 
by the member states’ attitude. Governments, 
which invested a  lot in cybersecurity, are not 
eager to share technologies with countries which 
neglected this area.11 In addition, cybersecurity 
experts point to the lack of NATO plans to de-
velop joint offensive capabilities in cyberspace. 
These are provided by individual allies, which 
follow different strategies. The absence of a prop-
er cyber command in NATO is considered to be 
another shortcoming. Such a command would 
enable NATO to develop a single doctrine, and 
to integrate and plan capabilities.12 Finally, there 
is concern that NATO will inevitably lag behind 
the cyber aggressors due to the growing scale 
of hostile activities in cyberspace. Therefore, the 
cooperation with business has become increas-
11 M. Veenendaal, K. Kaska, P. Brangetto, ‘Is NATO Ready to 
Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?’, CCDCOE, Tallinn 
2016, ccdcoe.org.
12  S. Arts, ‘Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s 
Cyber Policy’, GMF, 13 December 2018, www.gmfus.org.
NATO plays a triple role in cyber-
space. It motivates the allies to in-
vest more in cybersecurity, serves as 
a platform for information sharing 
and training, and protects its own 
networks.
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ingly important. NATO works with the private 
sector through its Malware Information Sharing 
Platform (sharing information on malware and 
their indicators with trusted partners) and through 
the Industry Cyber Partnership (led by the NATO 
Communications and Information Agency). 
(4) NATO exercises are of key importance for en-
hancing allied resilience against hybrid threats. 
NATO has employed here a two-track approach. 
On the one hand, since 2016, NATO has incor-
porated hybrid scenarios into its annual Crisis 
Management Exercise (CMX), which rehearses 
internal political and military decision-making 
mechanisms. On the other, it has tested allied 
military capabilities and readiness to respond 
to hybrid activities in various live exercises (NRF 
and VJTF exercises like Trident Juncture or Bril-
liant/Noble Jump). During these exercises, NATO 
forces have been mastering, for instance, critical 
infrastructure protection and combating irregular 
troops (including urban warfare).
The EU’s priorities: situational aware-
ness, cybersecurity and disinformation
(1) The EU strives for an improvement of European 
capabilities to analyse and share information on 
hybrid threats for the needs of its institutional 
framework and the member states. In 2016, it 
established a Hybrid Fusion Cell as part of the 
EU Intelligence and Situation Centre. The cell 
deals with threat analyses and collecting data 
on hybrid activities on the EU’s territory and in 
its neighbourhood. In the following year, in 2017, 
the EU’s anti-hybrid toolbox was expanded to 
include the Helsinki-based European Centre of 
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which is 
open to both EU and NATO members. The goal of 
this international research and training platform 
is to develop a better understanding of hybrid 
threats and the best practices in fighting them. It 
is legitimate to assume that intelligence sharing 
within the EU faces similar limitations as in NATO.
(2) The commitment to secure cyberspace plays 
a central role in the EU’s approach towards hy-
brid threats. Both protecting critical infrastruc-
ture and the functioning of the single market 
are increasingly dependent on the resilience of 
national networks. Existing vulnerabilities were 
revealed by two large-scale cyberattacks in 2017: 
WannaCry and NotPetya.13 The first one disrupt-
ed activities of the UK’s National Health Service, 
Germany’s Deutsche Bahn, France’s Renault and 
Spain’s Telefónica, among others. The latter tar-
geted mainly Ukraine, however Denmark’s A.P. 
Møller-Mærsk also suffered significant financial 
losses (estimated at the level of US$ 300 million).
The adoption of the first EU-wide legislation on 
cybersecurity, the 2016 Directive on Security of 
Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive), 
was a major breakthrough in enhancing resilience 
against hybrid threats. Consequently, Brussels 
started to develop the horizontal regulatory frame-
work for cybersecurity and obliged the member 
states to ensure a common minimum level of 
the security of national networks. On the basis 
of the NIS Directive, countries were required to 
adopt their own cybersecurity strategies, estab-
lish Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRT) and a European CSIRT Network (in order to 
strengthen information sharing and a coordinated 
response to cyber threats). Moreover, operators of 
essential services (energy, transport, water, bank-
ing, financial market and digital infrastructures, 
healthcare) as well as providers of key digital 
services (search engines, cloud computing and 
online marketplaces) were required to notify se-
rious incidents to the relevant national authority.14
13 D. Fiott, R. Parkes, op. cit.
14 M. Grzybowski,  ‘9 faktów o  Dyrektywie NIS, które 
powinieneś znać’, Fundacja Bezpieczna Cyberprzestrzeń, 
15 November 2016, www.cybsecurity.org. NIS Directive 
was supplemented by the 2019 EU Cybersecurity Act, which 
introduced an EU-wide cybersecurity certification frame-
work for digital products, services and processes.
The commitment to secure cyber-
space plays a central role in the EU’s 
approach towards hybrid threats. Ex-
isting vulnerabilities were revealed by 
two large-scale cyberattacks in 2017.
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These legislative actions have been bolstered 
through complementary measures aimed at 
strengthening “deterrence” in cyberspace and 
cyber defence capabilities. In 2019, the Council of 
the European Union allowed sanctions on non-EU 
actors (persons or entities) to be imposed where 
they are responsible for cyberattacks (carried out 
from outside the EU). A new sanctions regime in-
cludes a travel ban to the EU and an asset freeze.15 
In the future, it could become an important tool 
for the EU in its fight against malicious behaviour 
in cyberspace, especially against state-sponsored 
hacking groups. Besides, since 2017, thanks to 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on 
security and defence (part of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy), several European mil-
itary cooperation projects on cyber defence have 
been launched. They are directed at streamlining 
information sharing and coordination, developing 
rapid response capabilities in cyberspace, and 
enhancing cyber education and innovations.
In the field of cybersecurity, aside from protecting 
its own networks, the EU provides support for 
the development of research programmes and 
of public-private partnership. The EU Agency for 
Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European Cyber 
Security Organisation (established in 2016) are 
particularly active here. The first one is tasked 
with drawing recommendations and delivering 
expertise on cybersecurity issues, while the lat-
ter focuses on deepening trilateral cooperation 
between businesses, the European Commission 
and the member states. 
Despite these efforts, the EU’s cooperation on 
cybersecurity has so far been developed below 
the level of the European Commission’s ambitions. 
This is because the member states consider data 
15 ‘Cyber-attacks: Council is now able to impose sanctions’, 
The Council of the European Union, 17 May 2019, www.
consilium.europa.eu.
on cyberattacks as sensitive information. In ad-
dition, compared to investments at the national 
level, the EU’s engagement in cyberspace lacks 
proper funding. ENISA’s endless struggle for extra 
financing and personnel may serve as an example 
here. The cooperation has also been inhibited by 
different goals pursued by individual countries 
with respect to cybersecurity. It is visible, for 
instance, in the incoherent approaches to use of 
Chinese technologies in developing 5G. 
(3) The EU defines disinformation as “verifiably 
false or misleading information created, presented 
and disseminated for economic gain or to inten-
tionally deceive the public”.16 For the European 
intuitions, the issue of disinformation has been in 
the spotlight due to the urgent need to protect 
democratic elections from external meddling and 
manipulations. The spread of terrorist propaganda 
has been another important factor. In combating 
disinformation, the EU focuses on monitoring 
and revealing hostile campaigns, as well as on 
cooperation with online platforms.17
In recent years, the EU has created a toolbox for 
tracking and detecting disinformation. It started 
in 2015 with the establishment of the Europe-
an External Action Service’s East StratCom Task 
Force, responsible for analysing disinformation 
trends and exposing disinformation narratives 
originating from Russia. There are two other Strat-
Coms: profiled on the Southern Neighbourhood 
and the Western Balkans. In connection with the 
2019 European Parliament election, the European 
network of fact-checkers and the Rapid Alert Sys-
tem against online disinformation have also been 
created. The latter is a secure network for sharing 
information about disinformation, designed for 
the EU institutions and the member states. It 
was supposed to facilitate the coordination of 
responses to disinformation campaigns, but it 
has never been activated.18 Despite being one 
16 ‘Tackling online disinformation’, European Commission, 
www.ec.europa.eu.
17 The EU has adopted a whole raft of “soft laws” concerning 
the fight against disinformation.
18  S. Stolton, ‘EU mulls disinformation regulation but admits 
alert system has ‘never been triggered’, Euractiv, 29 October 
2019, www.euractiv.com.
In combating disinformation, the EU 
focuses on monitoring and revealing 
hostile campaigns, as well as on 
cooperation with online platforms.
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of the main planks of EU’s fight against hybrid 
threats, the European anti-disinformation sys-
tem has faced several problems. Firstly, it does 
not cover the dissemination of disinformation 
by EU-based actors, which significantly limits the 
effectiveness of the anti-disinformation measures. 
Secondly, newly-established institutions struggle 
with underfunding and personnel deficits. This is 
well illustrated by repeated calls for strengthening 
the East StratCom, staffed with sixteen full-time 
specialists, made by experts and members of the 
European Parliament. The most recent ones were 
related to disinformation campaigns around the 
COVID-19 pandemic.19
The EU’s defensive and reactive approach to dis-
information, based on monitoring and exposing, 
presents another challenge. This strategy lacks 
efforts to create a European narrative which would 
19 G. Gotev, ‘Experts lament underfunding of EU task force 
countering Russian disinformation’, Euractiv, 23 Novem-
ber 2018, www.euractiv.com; parliamentary question by 
Anna Fotyga on strengthening the East Stratcom Task 
Force, extending its work and turning it into a fully-fledged 
permanent structure within the EEAS, European Parliament, 
6 April 2020, www.europarl.europa.eu.
undermine the credibility of actors spreading 
disinformation. It could include, for instance, co-
ordinated public statements by members of the 
European Parliament or regular media campaigns 
with a broad outreach.
However, the future ups and downs in counter-
ing disinformation will be determined mainly by 
the development of public-private partnership, 
especially by cooperation with the biggest on-
line platforms – the signatories of the Code of 
Practice against disinformation (2019). These are: 
Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla, which 
agreed to self-regulatory standards in this area 
(on a voluntary basis). Being concerned with the 
rise of online disinformation, the EU strives for 
transparency in political advertising, advertising 
policy and algorithms, and for effective solutions 
in detecting and marking bots, and in closing 
fake accounts. Previous experiences show that 
the online platforms have not fully complied with 
the Code of Practice. In future this may lead to 
the introduction of regulatory measures by the 
European Commission.
